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THE BUREAUCRATIC COURT
Benjamin C. Mizer*
COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE

SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK. By Todd C. Peppers. Stanford: Stanford
University Press. 2006. Pp. xvi, 310. Cloth, $55; paper, $21.95.
SORCERERS'

APPRENTICES:

100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED

STATES SUPREME COURT. By Artemus Ward and David L. Weiden. New York
and London: New York University Press. 2006. Pp. xiv, 337. $39.
INTRODUCTION

In August 2006, the New York Times caused a stir by reporting that the
number of female law clerks at the United States Supreme Court has fallen
sharply in the first full Term in which Justice Sandra Day O'Connor is no
longer on the bench.' In an era in which nearly fifty percent of all law school
graduates are women, the Times reported, less than twenty percent of the
clerks in the Court's 2006 Term-seven of thirty-seven-are women. 2 In
interviews, Justices Souter and Breyer viewed the sharp drop in the number
of female clerks as an aberration from most years, when women typically
comprise one-third of all clerks.3
What is perhaps most notable about the Times article is that it assumes
the newsworthiness of the demographics of an anonymous group of temporary judicial aides. The article was not the first time the Court's hiring
practices have come under fire in recent years, nor is the fascination with
Supreme Court clerks anything new. In the 1970s, Bob Woodward and Scott
Armstrong rattled the cloistered Court with their best-selling Brethren,4 and
twenty years later former Blackmun clerk Edward Lazarus broke the clerks'
code of silence and published a tell-all insider's account in Closed Chambers.5
*

Associate, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP; law clerk to Justice John Paul

Stevens, U.S. Supreme Court, 2003-2004. I am grateful to Eve Brensike, Leondra Kruger, and
Julian Davis Mortenson for feedback on prior drafts of this Review. All of the views expressed in the
Review are, of course, mine and mine alone.
1. See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Memo; Women Suddenly Scarce Among Justices'
Clerks, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 30,2006, at Al.
2.

Id.

3.

Id.
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Now those gossipy texts have been supplemented by two more dispassionate and scholarly works that tell a fuller tale of the history and role of
Supreme Court clerks. Rather than focusing on the personalities of the justices and inter-clerk politics, these new texts set out to answer, as Todd C.
67
Peppers puts it in Courtiersof the Marble Palace,7 "the more important and
interesting questions" left open by the prior literature: "[Wihat are the institutional roles and norms surrounding the hiring and utilization of law clerks
... how have these rules evolved over time, and do these institutional structures allow law clerks to leave their own fingerprints on constitutional
doctrine?" (Peppers, p. xiv). Artemus Ward 8 and David L. Weiden 9-who,
like Peppers, are political scientists rather than practicing lawyersundertake a similar project in Sorcerers' Apprentices.'° Their ultimate purpose is to probe the Court's bureaucracy to discern, to the extent possible,
exactly how much influence the clerks exert over their bosses and over the
shape of American law (Ward & Weiden, pp. 9-10).
Before discussing the books in any detail, it's fair to ask why we should
care. What is it about this anonymous collection of recent law graduates that
has sparked so much attention over the years? Is the subject really so interesting or so important as to warrant not one but two books in the same year?
Part of the answer may simply be the natural curiosity that elite institutions so often pique. Peppers opens his book by reciting the litany of
powerful positions that former clerks have occupied, from cabinet posts to
the helms of industry to seats on the Supreme Court. "No other internship
program in the history of the United States," he says, "has produced as impressive and diverse a collection of individuals as the U.S. Supreme Court
law clerk corps" (Peppers, p. 1).
The more basic answer, though, is likely our fascination with power. As
Peppers observes, "[t]he American public loves a good conspiracy story, and
tales of deception, manipulation, and the wielding of power among a secretive group hidden away in the Marble Palace have fired the imagination"
(Peppers, p. 206). At bottom, then, that is what both of these books are
about-trying to reach a fuller understanding of a notable source of influence on the nine most powerful judges in the country. If we can't get inside
the justices' heads to find out what shapes their decision-making, maybe we
can at least come close by talking to the people who do their bidding.
The clerks' unwritten agreement of secrecy only adds to the mystique. It
certainly made things harder for the authors, who encountered resistance

6. Assistant Professor, Department of Public Affairs, Roanoke College. Peppers attended
the University of Virginia School of Law and held two federal clerkships.
7. TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF
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from former clerks unwilling to talk about their experiences or even to return the authors' surveys. Only two justices-Justice Stevens on the record
and Justice Scalia off-were willing to discuss the subject of clerks (both
with Peppers).
Despite the obstacle of confidentiality, both books manage to paint a
reasonably complete picture of the clerk's role. Peppers adopts a workmanlike style: he painstakingly takes the reader through the years and
examines how virtually every justice since the late nineteenth century used
his or her clerks. Throughout the book he uses principal-agent theory to test
his hypothesis that "justices create rules and informal norms designed to
constrain law clerks from pursuing their own self-interests" (Peppers, p. 16).
Ward and Weiden's structure is less temporal and more functional: each
chapter focuses on a different stage in the process in which clerks might
exert influence-in hiring, in granting certiorari, in drafting opinions, and in
deciding cases.
Not surprisingly, the image that emerges is of a Court that, through the
years, has become increasingly bureaucratic. The question is whether, as the
bureaucracy has burgeoned, the clerks' influence on the justices has outpaced the justices' ability to check that influence.
I.

FROM STENOGRAPHERS TO JUNIOR PARTNERS

The first Supreme Court clerk was hired when Justice Horace Gray was
appointed to the Court in 1882. Gray was simply continuing the practice he
had initiated as chief judge of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court of
hiring recent Harvard Law School graduates to serve as his legal secretaries." Ward and Weiden posit that Gray's clerkship practice, and that of other
judges of his era, was rooted in the English apprenticeship model of legal
education. Because most of the nineteenth-century jurists were trained in the
law as apprentices rather than at modern law schools, 2 it was natural for
them to adopt apprentices or students once they were on the bench.' 3 Ward
and Weiden's theory, then, is that the clerkship as we know it today "is a
manifestation of the last vestiges of the apprentice model in American law"
(Ward & Weiden, p. 29).
Justice Gray's clerks were selected by the Justice's brother, Harvard law
professor John Chipman Gray (Peppers, p. 44). For some time the practice of
having law school faculty members select the clerks-usually sight unseen by
the justice-was the norm, at least for some justices. John Chipman Gray
11.
Peppers, p. 44. Both books are filled with the names of former clerks who went on to
have illustrious legal careers of their own. Among the names that jump out from the list of former

Gray clerks is Samuel Williston, who is most notable for his still-authoritative treatise on contracts.
Peppers, p. 47.

12. Justice Gray actually received double the customary legal training: he graduated from
Harvard Law School in 1849 before apprenticing for a judge and at a law firm. Ward & Weiden, p.
29.
13.

Ward & Weiden, pp. 26-27. The law school model of education would become de

rigueur after Dean Langdell revived it at Harvard in the 1870s. Ward & Weiden, p. 27.
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also selected clerks for Justice Holmes, and after Gray's death the responsibility of choosing Holmes's clerks at Harvard shifted to then-Professor Felix
Frankfurter (Peppers, p. 56). Frankfurter would do the same for Justice
Brandeis (also a former Gray clerk) and others until joining the Court himself (Peppers, pp. 45, 62).
A. Clerk Demographics
The justices' hiring practices have come a long way from the days of
blind reliance on Professor Frankfurter. Both Courtiers and Apprentices devote considerable time to examining that evolution and the demographics of
the clerk pool. Beginning with Justice Gray's first clerk, Harvard enjoyed a
virtual lock on clerkship positions, and it took some years for that stranglehold to ease. The bias toward Harvard graduates gradually gave way to
favoritism for a handful of elite schools, including Harvard, that remains
firmly in place today. Twenty-eight percent of all clerks between 1882 and
2002 attended Harvard; seventeen percent went to Yale (Ward & Weiden,
p. 72). When the five other top clerk-producing schools--Chicago, Columbia, Stanford, Virginia, and Michigan-are included, a mere seven schools
have supplied seventy-three percent of the Court's clerks over the years
(Ward & Weiden, p. 73).
Other factors illustrate the relative homogeneity of the clerkship classes.
Ever since the Warren Court made prior clerkship experience a virtual prerequisite, certain appeals court judges have emerged as "feeders" who
regularly send their clerks on to the Supreme Court.14 The clear winner on
this score is former Fourth Circuit Judge J. Michael Luttig, who regularly
sent all of his clerks on to the Court. With Luttig's recent retirement, Judge
Guido Calabresi stands atop the list of feeders: on average, he places more
than two of his clerks at the High Court each year."
In addition to the clerks' relative academic and ideological homogeneity,
it is no secret that the clerkship ranks have historically been lacking in
women and racial minorities. The first woman to clerk at the Court was
Lucille Lomen, whom Justice Douglas hired in 1944, apparently more because of the shortage of male clerks during wartime than because of any
concerns about diversity (Peppers, p. 20). More than twenty years would
pass before another woman entered the clerkship ranks, and her service was
less than exemplary: when Justice Black hired Margaret Corcoran in 1966, it
was because of political connections, and Corcoran spent her days sleeping
14. Ward & Weiden, p. 82. Sometimes clerking for a feeder judge can backfire if the judge
has unfavorable things to say about the clerk. Ward and Weiden quote a recommendation letter to
Justice Black in which Judge Jerome Frank explained that a candidate who looked excellent on
paper was actually "a first-rate neurotic" and a "very unpleasant fellow" likely on the verge of a
"nervous breakdown." Ward & Weiden, p. 77.
15. Ward & Weiden, p. 82. There also tends to be a congruence between the ideology of the
feeder and the justices who routinely take that judge's clerks. In his fifteen years on the Fourth Circuit, for instance, Judge Luttig never sent a clerk to the chambers of Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, or Breyer. Ward & Weiden, p. 84. Judge Calabresi sends most of his former clerks on to
the more liberal justices. Peppers, p. 33.
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in Black's upstairs chamber (Peppers, pp. 20-21). But gradually the number
of female clerks began to grow. In the 1970s, ten percent of the clerks were
women; that number increased to twenty-three percent in the 1980s and to
thirty percent in the 1990s (Peppers, p. 21).
A few years after Lucille Lomen broke the gender barrier, Justice Frankfurter hired the Court's first African-American law clerk, William T.
Coleman, Jr., in 1948 (Peppers, p. 103). The hiring of Coleman, who had
been a standout at Harvard, was an occasion momentous enough to garner
notice in the New York Times and the Washington Post (Peppers, p. 22). Although Frankfurter saw the hiring decision as purely a matter of merit, it
took some mettle: just the prior year, one of Frankfurter's colleaguesJustice Stanley Reed-had vetoed the effort of a group of law clerks to
throw a Christmas party for the Court's entire staff because the party would
have been racially integrated (Ward & Weiden, pp. 93-94). It would be
nearly twenty years before Chief Justice Warren hired the Court's second
African-American clerk in 1967 (Ward & Weiden, p. 94).
A 1998 study found that of the sitting justices' cadre of clerks during
their tenures, fewer than 2% were African American, 5% were Asian American, and 25% were women (Ward & Weiden, p. 96). The study spawned
considerable controversy-the NAACP went so far as to supply the Court
with the resumes of African-American candidates for clerkships (Ward &
Weiden, pp. 94-95)-and seemed to get through to the justices. Peppers
reports that "[f]rom 1999 to 2004, the Rehnquist Court made some modest
changes in the diversity of its law clerk corps" (Peppers, p. 23). But as the
kerfuffle caused by the recent New York Times
article illustrates, the clerk6
ship ranks remain largely white and male.1
B. Clerk Responsibilities
Justice Gray-the first to begin the clerkship tradition-initially paid his
clerks' salaries out of his own pocket (Ward & Weiden, p. 24). But that practice didn't last long. In 1886, Congress provided a salary of 1,600 dollars for
a "stenographic clerk" for each chambers, which prompted many of the justices to follow Gray's lead and hire their own clerks (Ward & Weiden, p.
24). Over time, as the justices' workload grew, the number of clerks grew
with it, as did the nature of the clerks' work (Ward & Weiden, p. 25).
The justices' clerks were initially called "secretaries," and their duties
for the most part matched their title (Ward & Weiden, p. 30-31). Justice
Gray was not only the first to hire clerks, but he was also the first to use
them for more than purely clerical responsibilities, including opinion drafting (Ward & Weiden, pp. 33-34). A major shift occurred in 1919, when
Congress authorized a "law clerk" position in addition to the "stenographic
clerk," allowing the justices to hire two assistants, and the clerk's role as
legal researcher became firmly established (Ward & Weiden, p. 34). Justices
Holmes and Brandeis had already relied heavily on their clerks to check
16.

See Greenhouse, supra note 1.
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citations, conduct legal research, and suggest changes in opinions (Ward &
Weiden, p. 35). Now, during the tenure of Chief Justice Taft, more justices
began to follow that model (Peppers, pp. 83-84).
Chief among the clerks' new responsibilities was drafting memoranda
on the petitions for certiorari-usually called "cert petitions" or simply
"certs"-in which parties asked the Court to hear their case (Ward & Weiden, p. 35). The cert memos became more important when Chief Justice
Hughes ended the practice of discussing every cert petition at the justices'
conference. He began circulating a "dead list" of petitions that would not be
discussed at conference unless another justice requested it (Ward & Weiden,
p. 37). Ward and Weiden explain that the clerks "now constituted a Courtwithin-a-Court as justices relied on them more and more" for the evaluation
of cert petitions (Ward & Weiden, p. 39). Eventually the crush of cert petitions caused the practice of the dead list to give way to the "discuss list."
Now, for a cert petition to get mentioned at conference, it must be placed on
the discuss list by either the chief justice or one of the other justices; otherwise it is denied automatically on the clerk's orders list (Ward & Weiden,
p. 126).
Two other events in the mid-twentieth century affected the role of the
clerks. The first was the move into the Court's new building in 1935. For the
first time, the Court had its own space, and justices began working in their
new chambers rather than at home, as had previously been the norm (Peppers, p. 99). The close quarters allowed the justices to begin more regularly
lobbying their colleagues and-to the chagrin of some-their colleagues'
clerks (as was the wont of Frankfurter in particular) (Peppers, pp. 101-02).
It also facilitated what Ward and Weiden call a "clerk network," in which the
interaction among clerks provided "an important resource to their justices in
obtaining information about the positions of their colleagues" (Ward &
Weiden, p. 43).
The second significant event was the appointment of Chief Justice Warren in 1953. Peppers observes that Warren's heavy substantive reliance on
his clerks ushered in an era in which the justices shifted from treating their
clerks as "legal assistants" to using them more as "law firm associates"
(Peppers, pp. 151-52). Two new duties in particular became commonplace
during Warren's tenure: (1) writing bench memoranda to prepare the justices
for oral argument and assist their decision-making in merits cases, and (2)
drafting opinions (Peppers, p. 151).
Warren also instituted an important administrative change that affected
the clerks' role. Prior to Warren's tenure, the justices received opinion assignments based on how much was currently on their plate. This practice
meant that the justices who churned out opinions more quickly also received
more assignments. Warren determined, as Justice Douglas put it, "that every
member of the Court should pull the same size oar and row as hard as any-
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body else."' 7 Warren's efforts to even out the workload translated into even
greater opinion-drafting responsibilities for the clerks as the more methodical justices struggled to keep [Doesn't this footnote belong at the end of the
paragraph?] pace with their faster colleagues (Ward & Weiden, pp. 42-43).
One of those more methodical justices was Frankfurter, who, like many of
his colleagues, began to think of his clerks as "junior partners-junior only
in years. ' ' 8
One last significant development led to the clerkship institution as we
now know it. Beginning around 1950, cert petitions began to inundate the
Court; by 1970, the justices were receiving 4,000 petitions a year. Justice
Powell was shocked by the cert workload when he first arrived at the Court,
grumbling to his clerks that the "ubiquitous things will be with us always."' 9
Powell suggested the creation of a "cert pool" to eliminate the duplication of
effort that occurred with nine clerks writing nine memos on the same petition. He proposed that one clerk in the pool write a single memo for each
petition that would then circulate to each justice in the pool (Ward & Weiden, p. 118). Five justices agreed to participate in the pool during its trial
term in 1972, and the experiment was such a success that today every justice
but one-Justice Stevens-is in the pool (Ward & Weiden, p. 125).
In practice the existence of the cert pool means that each petition is read
by two law clerks: the pool clerk and a Stevens clerk. A pool memo is written for every petition, while the Stevens clerks write memos for the Justice
in only a fraction of the cases (Ward & Weiden, p. 127). The justices rely on
the clerks as "gatekeepers," generally reading the papers themselves only
when the question of whether to grant cert appears to be close or when the
case is especially controversial (Ward & Weiden, p. 128). Ward and Weiden
speculate that the pool has made the cert memos less candid and more cautious than they had been when the clerk was writing only for his or her
individual justice, and that the memo writers increasingly focus on objectively "cert-worthy" factors such as the existence of a split among the circuit
courts (Ward & Weiden, pp. 129-32). Indeed, they report that the existence
of a circuit split has now emerged as the single most important factor in reviewing cert petitions (Ward & Weiden, p. 133).
The creation of the cert pool-and in particular its expansion to include
all but Justice Stevens's clerks-has actually had the effect of reducing the
pool clerks' cert workload. "In essence," Ward and Weiden find, "the pool
clerk's workload has been cut in half-an astonishing feat given that the
Court's docket has almost doubled at the same time" (Ward & Weiden, p.
142). The Apprentices authors speculate that this means "that pool clerks are
17. Ward & Weiden, p. 42 (quoting conversation between Justice William 0. Douglas and
Professor Walter F. Murphy, Cassette 14 (Apr. 5, 1963) (transcript available in the Princeton University Library)).
18.

Ward & Weiden, p. 41 (quoting LEONARD BAKER, BRANDEIS AND FRANKFURTER: A

DUAL BIOGRAPHY 415 (1984)).
19. Ward & Weiden, p. 118 (quoting Letter from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Hamilton Fox, Lawrence A. Hamilton, Covert Parnell & J. Harvie Wilkinson (Mar. 20, 1972) (on file with the
Washington and Lee University School of Law)).
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able to delve more deeply into each case than clerks from the previous era"
and suggest that "most of the additional time modem clerks gained by the
creation of the cert pool has been spent on opinion writing and is probably a
contributing factor in the explosion in the number
' 20 of separate concurring
and dissenting opinions now issued by the Court.
The upshot is that the justices' chambers have now largely become what
Chief Justice Rehnquist called "opinion writing bureaus" (Ward & Weiden,
p. 224). The authors of both books found that the current justices for the
most part delegate responsibility for first drafts of their opinions to their
clerks (Peppers, pp. 195-205; Ward & Weiden, pp. 225-26). The justices
provide guidance as to what the opinion should say and how it should be
structured, and they often then edit the draft heavily. But the clerks remain
deeply involved in the writing process (Ward & Weiden, pp. 224-26). The
exception to this general delegation rule is, again, Justice Stevens, who famously writes the first draft of all of his opinions (Peppers, pp. 195-96).
Because he writes his own first drafts and remains outside of the cert pool,
Peppers says Justice Stevens is "the only sitting Supreme Court justice who
has not fully adopted the rules and norms of the modem clerkship model"
(Peppers, p. 195).

II. "THE

STUDENTS OF MICHELANGELO

' 2

1

It is hard to quibble with the descriptive work in Courtiers and Apprentices. The authors of both books base their characterizations of the clerks'
functions on exhaustive archival research and interviews with former clerks,
among other sources. It is safe for the reader to assume that the authors have
painted an accurate picture of the law clerks' responsibilities, both in the
past and today. But what conclusions do they draw from all this research?
What do they have to tell us about the influence that clerks have on their
justices?
Peppers assesses the concept of influence as a political scientist. "To affect judicial decision making," he says,
[L]aw clerks must have more than simply the opportunity to exercise discretionary authority to determine the winners and losers. They must also
possess preferences or goals that differ from those of their justices; if law
clerks and justices share the same policy preferences or ideological positions, then any influence over decision making is not troubling because the
clerks are pursuing the same policy goals as the justices. (Peppers, p. 206)

20. Ward & Weiden p. 142. Although this observation correlates with the authors' statistics,
it is not fully consistent with the fact that Justice Stevens, who does not participate in the pool, also
tends to write the most separate opinions each term. See Bradley C. Canon, Justice John Paul Stevens: The Lone Ranger in a Black Robe, in THE BURGER COURT: POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL
PROFILES 344 (Charles M. Lamb & Stephen C. Halpern eds., 1991).
21. Yale Law School Dean Harold Koh, a former Blackmun clerk, has said that the clerks
"are like the students of Michelangelo. They may put the ink on paper, but it is according to the
justices' design." Ward & Weiden, p. 201.
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For a variety of reasons, he concludes that "[t]he necessary conditions
for the exercise of influence by law clerks have rarely, if ever, existed on the
Supreme Court" (Peppers, p. 206).
Apprentices and Courtiers identify a number of ways in which the justices curb the amount of influence their clerks have on the justices' decisionmaking. One of the most obvious is term limits: virtually all clerks serve for
only one term, meaning that they spend more time learning the ropes and
less time cultivating a close relationship that would enable them to influence
the justices (Peppers, p. 207; Ward & Weiden, p. 36). The increasing number
of clerks in each chamber, Ward and Weiden suggest, has also chilled the
extent to which clerks feel they can introduce new ideas or express views
different from those of their bosses (Ward & Weiden, p. 52). And, as a practical matter, the clerks' influence is necessarily limited as long as they are
not permitted on the bench during oral argument or in the conference room
during decision-making."
Two other, less tangible factors may be the most important checks on
clerk influence. By way of a variety of proxies-including the candidates'
organizational affiliations, the judges for whom they first clerked, and other
signals on their r6sumrs-the justices manage to ensure considerable ideological congruence with their clerks (Peppers, pp. 31-37, 209-10). That
alignment means that the clerks are less likely to have an "agenda" apart
from their bosses or to seek to alter the justices' views. It also tends to create
a strong sense of loyalty on behalf of the clerks toward their justices. Peppers frames this loyalty as a classic mode of principal-agent control: "[T]he
more an agent embraces his fiduciary duty to a principal, the less likely the
agent is to act in ways counter to the principal's goals. 23
In light of these checks, Peppers concludes that the opportunities for
clerks to influence the justices are rare:
It is improbable to conclude that law clerks systematically influence how
their justices vote, either in deciding cases or granting cert. petitions.
While the history of the clerkship institution is sprinkled with examples of
law clerks who changed a justice's vote, such examples are the exception
and not the rule."

22. Ward & Weiden, p. 155. Then again, as Ward and Weiden point out, the clerks' memos
can accompany the justices onto the bench and into the conference room. Ward & Weiden, p. 155.
23. Peppers, p. 123. But, as Peppers acknowledges, that bond of loyalty may break if the
agent feels betrayed by the principal. Peppers, pp. 204-05. In the October 2004 issue of Vanity Fair
magazine, an anonymous group of clerks from the Court's 2000 Term spilled the beans about some
of the behind-the-scenes maneuvering in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), explaining that they felt
the Court's abuse of power in that case justified their breach of confidentiality. David Margolick et
al., The Path to Florida,VANITY FAIR, Oct. 2004, at 310, 320. The Vanity Fairarticle begs the question unaddressed by Peppers: Who exactly is the principal? Is it the Court as a whole-as the clerks
who felt justified in talking to the magazine seem to suggest-or the individual justice?
24. Peppers, p. 165. One of the few specific instances of substantive influence that both
books cite is former Stone clerk Louis Lusky's claim that he was responsible for drafting the famous
Carolene Products footnote 4. Peppers, p. 91; Ward & Weiden, p. 203; see United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("Nor need we enquire ... whether prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the op-
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Peppers deems any influence to be confined to "the process of analyzing
highly complex factual records and legal claims and pulling out a dispositive
fact or compelling legal argument that would not have been otherwise considered by the justice" (Peppers, p. 165). Peppers's final assessment, then, is
that "law clerks do not wield an inordinate amount of influence." (Peppers,
p. 211). "Clerks arguably wield some influence in how judicial opinions are
drafted and which doctrinal tests are used, but even the cleverest law clerk
must still hold together a majority of the justices" (Peppers, p. 211).
Ward and Weiden reach a similar bottom line. They begin their book by
observing that "clerks do make decisions about cases that are often unseen
by those outside of their justice's chambers" and that "there exists a very
real danger of clerks using their positions to influence judicial decision
making" (Ward & Weiden, p. 53). But their statistical evidence shows that
this danger is rarely realized. Of the 123 former clerks who responded to the
authors' queries, 24% said they never changed their justice's mind on cases
or issues; 50% said they "seldom" had such an effect, and 24% reported that
they "sometimes" influenced their boss's decision. Only one person claimed
to have "frequently" made a difference (Ward & Weiden, p. 187). Based on
this data, Ward and Weiden conclude that "the influence of the clerk is neither negligible nor total"-that "clerks are not merely surrogates or agents,
but they are also not the behind-the-scenes manipulators portrayed by some
observers" (Ward & Weiden, p. 246).
Despite their evidence and apparent conclusions about clerk influence,
Ward and Weiden go on to assert that "some aspects of the role of the modem law clerk tread perilously close to what many critics see as an
unconstitutional abdication of the justices' duties" (Ward & Weiden, p. 246).
Accordingly, even as they acknowledge "that it is highly unlikely that any
significant reforms will take place in the near future, given institutional and
bureaucratic inertia," the authors propose that the Court reduce the opportunities for clerk influence by increasing disclosure of its "internal operations
and, at the same time, of the role that clerks play.' 25 Their most eye-popping
recommendation in this regard is a call for the publication of the pool
memos. "Releasing the pool memo," they suggest, "could help ensure that
pool writers are providing the kind of objective analysis that they are supposed to provide" (p. 247).
Ward and Weiden's provocative proposal has garnered some attention,
including an endorsement by Judge Richard Posner.26 But the authors myopically toss out their suggestion as a rein on clerk influence without
eration of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.").
25. Ward & Weiden, p. 247. Ward and Weiden also recommend that the Court "prohibit 'case
swapping' at each stage of the process," Ward & Weiden p. 248, that is, that clerks be prohibited
from trading the cases for which they are responsible within chambers. This suggestion seems gratuitous: the authors aren't really able to explain how often such swapping occurs or why. Nor is it
clear how their proposal-which would plainly meddle in the chambers' internal operations-would
curb any undue influence that might result from such swapping.
26.

Richard A. Posner, The Courthouse Mice, THE NEW

REPUBLIC,

June 12, 2006, at 32, 32.
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considering the effect it would have on the legal community writ large. All
too often, lawyers and court observers take cert denials as binding law, or at
least as an indication of the Court's views on the question presented. Imagine, then, if the cert pool memos were published. The temptation to read the
memos as having some legal effect would be overwhelming. Indeed, responsible judges and lower court judges would have little option but to take their
cues (and sometimes too their lumps) from the memos. Given that the
memos express the views of exactly none of the justices, that would be an
undesirable result, to say the least. Not to mention that such a result would
run directly contrary to Ward and Weiden's purpose: rather than diminishing
the importance of clerks, it would actually aggrandize clerks' ability to affect the law.
Even on its own terms-as a measure to curb the influence of law
clerks-Ward and Weiden's proposal seems unwise at best. Laura Ingraham,
a former Thomas clerk, has explained that a "fear factor" keeps the pool
memos "reliable" because the conscientious clerks are afraid of making a
mistake in a memo that will be seen by seven justices other than their own
(Ward & Weiden, p. 128-29). The prospect of widespread publication would
only heighten the fear factor and would likely turn the memos into veritable
opinions. At the very least the memos would naturally become less frank,
less concise, and less pithy. Ward and Weiden seem to assume that such a
change would be for the good, but it's not clear that they're right. The vernacular of the pool memo is valuable to justices who see many of the same
legal issues day in and day out; longer memos would only increase the
workload of the already-taxed justices and clerks.
Ward and Weiden's proposal is also premised on a conception of the Supreme Court as black box. But that premise is demonstrably false. True, the
Court's processes for granting cert are opaque, and its deliberations are secretive. But much of the justices' debate occurs publicly, in the courtroom,
17
where they engage lawyers for both sides before a gallery of observers.
And unlike its coordinate branches, the Supreme Court-indeed, the whole
of the federal judiciary-explains in detail the reasons for all of its decisions
and issues written justifications for all of its actions.
Apprentices and Courtiershave spawned a broader debate about the role
of Supreme Court clerks, and at least one other radical proposal. In The Atlantic, Stuart Taylor, Jr. and Benjamin Wittes offer "a modest proposal" for
reining in the justices' "high-handedness" and "strutting pomposity": "[F]ire
their clerks., 21 "Eliminating the law clerks," they say, "would force the justices
to focus more on legal analysis," and, "[p]erhaps best of all, it would effectively shorten their tenure by forcing them to do their own work, making their
27. Oral argument is now even more publicly accessible: Since October 2006, the Court has
made full transcripts available on its website on the same day as argument. See Press Release,
United States Supreme Court (Sept. 14, 2006), http://www.supremecourtus.gov (follow "Public
Information" hyperlink; then follow "Press Releases" hyperlink; then follow "Press Releases Regarding Oral Transcripts" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
28. Stuart Taylor, Jr. & Benjamin Wittes, Of Clerks and Perks, THE
2006, at 50, 50.
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jobs harder and inducing them to retire before power corrupts absolutely or
decrepitude sets in."'2 9
Taylor and Wittes's essay seems less a response to Apprentices and
Courtiers than it is a tirade about the unelected justices. 0 To the extent their
proposal is aimed at limiting the justices' lengthy tenures, other, more
thoughtful commentaries have offered more direct solutions.3 And to the
extent the essay is, in fact, sparked by a concern over the justices' work being done by "smart but unseasoned underlings,"" then it's not clear why
they stopped with the Supreme Court. Taken to its logical conclusion, their
indictment includes in its sweep other federal judges, all of Capitol Hill, and
most of the Executive Branch-all of those public servants who routinely
rely on aides to complete their work.33
Taylor and Wittes may be getting at a larger concern-one shared by
Judge Posner and the authors of Apprentices and Courtiers. As Ward and
Weiden put it:
The most damaging aspect ...of having judicial opinions written by
clerks is the potential loss of authority that these opinions carry. Indeed, it
is only respect for the Court's legitimacy that gives its judgments weight
with both the public and lower court judges who are expected to follow its
mandates. (Ward & Weiden, p. 236)
The authors are unquestionably correct that the Court's authority derives
in large part from respect for its decisions. 34 But neither the authors nor their
fellow critics offer any evidence that awareness that clerks have a hand in
drafting the justices' opinions diminishes respect for the Court. Indeed, if
anything, Apprentices and Courtiersshow that the justices have been relying
on their clerks for substantive assistance for more than a century, and that
their authority has been none diminished for it.
The fact is that Americans are perfectly comfortable with the notion that
public figures don't craft all of their own words. We attribute President
Kennedy's most memorable lines to the President himself, not to Arthur

29.

Id. Taylor and Wittes allow that the justices might be entitled to one clerk. Id.

30. To be fair, the Swiftian echo in Taylor and Wittes' "modest proposal" suggests their essay
is at least partially satirical. See JONATHAN SwIFT, A Modest Proposal, in A MODEST PROPOSAL
AND OTHER SATIRICAL WORKS

52-58 (Dover Publications 1996) (1729).

31.
See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court:
Life Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 769 (2006).
32.

Taylor & Wittes, supra note 28.

33. See Emily Bazelon & Dahlia Lithwick, Endangered Elitist Species, SLATE, June 13,
2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2143628 (offering a similar response to Taylor and Wittes).
34. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("It is confidence in
the men and women who administer the judicial system that is the true backbone of the rule of
law."); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) ("The Court's power lies
...in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows itself in the people's acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation's law means and to declare what it
demands. The underlying substance of this legitimacy ... is expressed in the Court's opinions, and
our contemporary understanding is such that a decision without principled justification would be no
judicial act at all.").
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Schlesinger. What matters is that the ideas belong to the person of authority-that the master provides the design and the student merely implements
it. Sorcerers' Apprentices and Courtiers of the Marble Palace suggest that
the relationship between Supreme Court justice and clerk falls squarely
within that model. No wonder, then, that there has been little public outcry
over the arrangement, and little movement to alter it.
CONCLUSION

In a way it's unfortunate that Apprentices and Courtiers were published
within months of each other, because the overlap is considerable; to read
one is, for the most part, to read both. There are differences, to be sure: Peppers's book is more scholarly and more painstakingly researched and
footnoted; Ward and Weiden's text is better structured, more engagingly
written, and, on the whole, the better read. Taken together, the two books
offer as complete and accurate a picture of the role of Supreme Court clerks
as one can get from outside the courthouse.
Unfortunately, Ward and Weiden slouch toward sensationalism when in
their title they invoke Goethe's poem about the sorcerer's apprentice who
gave into the temptation to don his absent master's robes and try his hand at
sorcery.35 It would be a nice metaphor if it worked, but it doesn't. Because
for all their efforts in their final chapter to raise the specter of undue influence, Ward and Weiden's own evidence doesn't support that conclusion.
Both Apprentices and Courtiers leave the reader with the distinct impression
that there's little to worry about. Do the clerks influence the justices? Yes,
naturally. But their influence appears to be neither very pervasive nor very
strong. In fact, it may even be a good thing insofar as the justices regularly
surround themselves with smart, young sounding boards with fresh ideas.
And rarely do the clerks change the outcome of a case. So the somewhat
sinister allusion of the sorcerer's apprentice is inapt, not to mention unfair. It
would seem that a more benign title-something more along the lines of
"Santa's Little Helpers"-would have been more fitting.

35. Ward & Weiden, p. 249. For some readers-including this one-the title may conjure to
mind first the Disney version of the Goethe parable featuring Mickey Mouse in Fantasia. FANTASIA
(Disney 1940). Which arguably makes the authors' point even more vividly.
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